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This paper outlines the future possible scenarios that the air transport sector may evolve into 
after 2010, starting from the most important trends from the past and actual market 
developments. A big market shift was the liberalization which was introduced in the 1990’s, 
which led to an improved capacity utilisation for both passengers and freight. The impacts on 
and reactions from airlines have been different over continents and over types of companies. 
Furthermore, increasing importance has been attached to yield, pushing airline companies 
towards various forms of co-operation and integration. In the future, some more 
developments may change the air transport market. First, we may expect a stronger split 
between traditional air transport and niche markets. Second, privatisation may be 
strengthening, not only among airlines, but also in airports. Third, mergers and acquisitions 
may drastically shift the market and lead to new competitive balances. Fourth, the Southwest 
model, based on low costs and low fares, is likely to survive, although some maturity is 
observed, but new products emerge. Fifth, the relatively large number of bankruptcies is a 
new phenomenon for air transport. Carriers not belonging to strategic alliances turn out to 
be more likely victims. Sixth, increasing aggressiveness in company strategies and reactions 
is observed, including price cuts but also hostile takeover bids. Seventh, privatization is 
gaining pace, while on the other hand governments will continue to be an important player, 
be it on a different front: as infrastructure providers, market regulators and environmental 
protectors. Eight, air freight is still a growing market, with an own network which is 
gradually developing, next to the passenger network. A ninth and last tendency is the entry of 
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more foreign and private equity capital, the latter of which may sometimes be at odds with 
the long-term strategies of the sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The airline business is almost like the laboratory of transport economics. It is an environment 
where technological and organisational developments unfold in rapid succession: among the 
world’s air transport companies, we observe all manner of industrial and economic 
evolutions, with frequent new entries, but also market exits through mergers, takeovers and 
bankruptcies; airports are increasingly confronted with ecological and capacity issues; 
regions are constantly competing with one another to attract players in the airline business; 
and new and innovative products, including low-cost airlines and full-freighter cargo 
services, are claiming an ever greater proportion of available capacity. 
The dynamic nature of the airline sector explains to an extent the growing interest from 
politics and science, as well as the world of business. Here, two issues come to the fore time 
and again: i) What is the economic significance of the air transport industry? and ii)  What 
future lies in store for that industry? 
This paper attempts to outline some of the likely developments in the air transport industry 
beyond 2010. If the trends that have unfolded in recent decades persist in the coming years, 
that alone will inevitably result in an altered market and ownership structure. Our forecasting 
exercise consists in four parts. We consecutively consider the present situation in the air 
transport business, including the development process of the last decade; we look at potential 
scenarios and strategies; we look at the business models; and finally we draw conclusions. 
2. Trends from the past 
The best starting point to gain an understanding of sectoral developments is arguable by 
analysing figures and trends from the past, over a sufficiently long period of time. Here, in 
the case of the international air transport business, we opt for an approach based on a number 
of important indicators of demand, supply and market structure. 
In the early 1990s, the air transport industry went through a deep, structural crisis, occasioned 
by, among other things, a combination of relatively weak economic activity and rising oil 
prices. In addition, there was the direct impact of the 1991 Gulf War and the Asian economic 
slump from 1992. Furthermore, there was the structural problem occasioned by the 
liberalisation of the air transport market, with initial overcapacity putting downward pressure 
on yields and profits.1
This far-reaching liberalisation has in any case created an entirely new market environment. 
Prior to the deregulation process, only national authorities, through their flag carriers, were 
                                                 
1 In the United States, the Airline Deregulation Act was introduced in 1978. The liberalisation of the European 
market was implemented much later. Europe’s deregulation programme was based on three packages of 
measures (1988, 1990, 1993), with each phase impacting on four areas: pricing, market access, competition and 
licensing (Button, 1998, pp. 30-44). Cabotage has been permitted within Europe since 1 April 1997. 
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able to organise scheduled services on the major routes. There was no question of 
competition, and operational efficiency was regarded as inessential.    
With the movement towards deregulation, however, the quasi-monopoly power of those flag 
carriers was seriously eroded, not in the least because it had become relatively simple for new 
companies to enter the marketplace. New and successful products were developed, as was 
apparent in the rise of so-called low-cost carriers. Innovative pricing strategies allowed 
companies to benefit maximally from different willingness to pay in different market 
segments. The continuous search for opportunities for cooperation in relation to reservation 
systems, frequency of service and slot allocation resulted in the emergence of a limited 
number of strategic alliances. 
This movement towards a profound liberalisation, coupled with the cyclical impact of 
economic activity, translates into the evolution outlined in figures 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1. World air transport scheduled services (domestic + international) – passengers 
Source: IATA  
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Figure 2. World air transport scheduled services (domestic + international) – freight 
Source: IATA  
 
In the period under consideration, there is clear evidence of substantial growth in the 
industry, as is aptly summarised in table 1.  
 
Table 1. World air transport: growth figures (1991-2005, scheduled services, domestic + 
international) 
Indicator Growth rate (%) 
Passengers carried 81.8 
Passenger-kilometres 103.6 
Available seat-kilometres 79.9 
Freight tonnes carried 117.6 
Tonne-kilometres performed 149 
Available tonne-kilometres 101 
 
Source: IATA (1991-2006) 
 
There are however notable differences in respect of where the growth was achieved, which in 
turn impacts on the structure of the air transport sector: 
• In the period under consideration, there was very strong growth in terms of passengers 
carried; 
• The even greater growth recorded in passenger-kilometres performed indicates that 
the average air passenger travelled greater distances; 
• While still strong, growth in the number of available seat-kilometres was slower than 
that in passenger-kilometres performed, resulting in a marked improvement in the 
seat-occupancy rate; 
• The growth figures recorded in freight transport are even more impressive, with 
freight tonnes carried more than doubling over the period considered; 
• Freight was, on average, carried over shorter distances, as is reflected in the fact that 
growth in tonne-kilometres performed was more modest than the rise in freight tonnes 
carried; 
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• As in passenger transport, freight transport saw a substantial improvement in capacity 
utilisation, as growth in available capacity was lower than growth in tonne-kilometres 
performed. 
While the above graphs and tables undeniably provide an overview of the most significant 
developments in the air transport business, they do also ‘mask’ a number of evolutions. First 
and foremost, there are remarkable regional differences to take into account. Moreover, the 
developments described above have altered the air transport landscape profoundly. 
Particularly in respect of the actual carriers, the industry has evolved towards a typology 
consisting of at least four categories: network airlines, regional and smaller network airlines, 
charter companies, and low-cost airlines. Starting from this typology, we discern quite 
divergent evolutions: 
• The picture in Europe is mixed. The three largest carriers (British Airways, Lufthansa 
and Air France) have performed well. However, there have also been a number of 
bankruptcies (e.g. Sabena and Swissair), while other companies have had to contend 
or continue to contend with looming crisis (e.g. Alitalia and Olympic). In the charter 
market, we have witnessed some successful start-ups (e.g. TCAB), followed by a 
concentration movement resulting in a limited number of large groups (e.g. Thomas 
Cook and TUI). Another notable trend has been the rise and growth of some 
important low-cost airlines (Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin,…). 
• In the United States, recent years have brought a thorough reorganisation in the air 
transport market. With the exception of American Airlines, all major companies 
(United Airlines, US Airways, Delta, Continental Airlines,…) have gone through 
Chapter 11, resulting in reorganisation and a healthier cost structure. 
• The impressive economic growth rate in Asia has also had a positive impact on the 
Asian carriers. Importantly, though, Asian growth is generating scarcity, including of 
pilots. 
• In the Arab world, we have seen strong growth in the case of some carriers (incl. 
Qatar, Etihad, Emirates,…); the strategy pursued by these carriers is clearly linked 
with the striving for diversification among the region’s political leaders. 
The question that now confronts the airline industry and its business environment is how 
matters will evolve further. Will this strong growth persist in the coming decade? Does it 
justify fresh investment in additional capacity, in terms of both aircraft and airports? Does it 
make sense in the short run for political attention to focus on possible bottlenecks, including 
in respect of air space and slot allocation? 
3. Towards a new business model? 
The air transport business involves a highly heterogeneous array of actors. Some remain 
subject to a form of state control, others are fully privatised, and others yet operate under a 
mixed regime. As far as the privately controlled players are concerned, the corporate 
objective is obviously profit maximisation. The non-privately controlled players, on the other 
hand, usually pursue other goals, such as maximisation of employment and/or value added, 
or, more generally, the maximisation of socioeconomic surplus. 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
The Air Transport Sector after 2010: A Modified Market and Ownership Structure 76 
Doganis (2001) asserts that, within the present air transport sector, a distinction can be made 
between three business models, each of which has its own specific objectives. Table 2 
provides a summary of this perspective. 
 
Table 2. Business models in the air transport business 
Business models Variables Targets 
Traditional airline model Unit costs Increasing revenues 
Virtual airline model Yields Larger market 
Aviation business model Load factors Shareholder value 
 
Source: Doganis (2001) 
 
A thorough analysis of the strategic behaviour of a number of carriers shows that, while each 
airline tends to position its own product in a specific way, the available tools are invariably 
the same. The approach taken always combines control over the unit cost and optimisation of 
the seat occupancy or loading factor with a striving to maximise the yield.  
In the future, ever greater emphasis will be placed on achieving a sufficiently high yield, with 
carriers also generating income from non-flying activities through every passenger. Ryanair 
is a case in point. Not only does the company apply many surcharges, including a luggage 
check-in fee and a fee for payment by credit card, but significantly, in the 2006-2007 
financial year, Ryanair generated more than half of its operational result (earnings before 
interest and tax) through activities that had little or nothing to do with flying. Typical 
examples are such diversification activities as car rentals and hotel room reservations, for 
which Ryanair earns a commission. 
There are clearly links between the various actors, both within a particular subsector (e.g. the 
airline industry) and beyond (e.g. between airlines and ground-handling companies). Table 3 
provides an overview of the different kinds of links encountered. 
Each company operating in the air transport business may have committed to different types 
of agreement with different players. French carrier Air France, for example, has effectively 
taken over Dutch airline KLM in a merger/acquisition, while at the same time entering into 
code-share agreements with numerous other carriers. Moreover, the company is part of the 
strong SkyTeam airline alliance. Hence, for each enterprise, a specific cell can distinctly be 
completed in table 3, as every market player has a specific structure and corporate history. 
It is equally interesting to highlight and subsequently quantify the existing links between 
partners at airport level. Who provides which services to whom, and to what extent are actors 
dependent upon specific suppliers and clients? Consider the example of LCC easyJet, which 
in 2007 launched flights from Brussels to Nice and Geneva. This new entry was, first and 
foremost, in direct competition with Brussels Airlines and Swiss, both of which companies 
were already operating flights on these routes. Second, there were derived effects for service 
suppliers, including ground-handling companies. 
Figure 3 provides insight into the structure of relationships between actors in the air cargo 
business. The arrows indicate existing relationships and their direction. These relationships 
may, in a subsequent phase, be quantified. A similar methodology has already been applied to 
port and maritime relations within the port of Antwerp in Coppens et al. (2007). 
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Table 3. Control and cooperation between subsectors in the air transport industry 
 
Market 
actors 
Airlines Handling 
companies 
Airport operators Authorities 
* Mergers and acquisitions (e.g. 
Air France and KLM; Air Berlin 
and Condor) 
* Alliances (e.g. STAR) 
* Code-share agreements 
* Joint ventures (e.g. Lufthansa 
Cargo and DHL Express) 
Airlines 
* Participations (e.g. Thomas Cook 
in Air Berlin) 
      
* Previously sometimes integrated 
in airline (cfr. monopoly risk by 
dominant national carrier), 
nowadays often outsourced 
Handling 
companies 
* Specific contracts (e.g. in 2007 
Martinair with Aviapartner, for 9 
German airports, for 3 years) 
* Concentration 
by take-overs 
(e.g. Aviapartner, 
Menzies,…) 
    
* Participations (e.g. Lufthansa in 
Munich) 
* Assignment, 
concessions 
Airport 
operators 
* Co-operation between airports 
and airlines (e.g. Charleroi and 
Ryanair) 
* Integration 
(e.g. Aeropuertos 
Argentina 2000) 
Mergers/acquisitions 
(e.g. Brussels Airport 
by Macquarie) 
  
* Monopoly by 
airport authority 
or its sole 
concessionaire 
Authorities * Participation government in Flag 
Carriers (e.g. Olympic, TAP,…) 
* Concession 
assignment 
control 
Participation 
government in 
airports, including 
(partial) privatization 
Participation 
governments in 
airlines (e.g. 
French and 
Italian State in 
Alitalia) 
 
 
Major 
actors
SHIPPERS
AGENTS
AIRLINE
COMPANIES
TERMINAL
OPERATING
COMPANIES
(handling 
and storage)
HINTERLAND 
TRANSPORT
COMPANIES
Other 
service 
providers
Cargo handlers
Customs brokers Air Traffic Control
Customs
Airplane maintenance
Catering services
Fuel providers
FORWARDERS
 
Figure 3. Air transport actors (cargo business case) 
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The above overview shows quite clearly how the airline industry is subject to constant change 
and how it is evolving towards new business models. Hence the importance of being able to 
estimate the potential impact of that evolution on the future airline market. 
4. Gambling on uncertainty? An outline of the future market 
Predicting a future market is inevitably fraught with uncertainty. So too in the air transport 
sector. Uncertainty can never be eliminated entirely. At best, it can be channelled to some 
extent. 
In what follows, we shall attempt to outline possible future developments. Our starting point 
is invariably a combination of the present situation, recent trends and a set of endogenous and 
exogenous variables. Among the exogenous variables under consideration are such factors as 
economic activity, fuel prices and the price of aircraft, either newly purchased, second-hand 
or leased. Endogenous variables are the yields, the cost structure (cf. hedging agreement or 
not), financial indicators, capacity utilisation, mergers and acquisitions. 
The future developments we wish to put forward are the following. 
• A clear distinction between global network carriers and niche players 
• More privatisation 
• Alliances influenced by cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
• Survival of the Southwest model 
• More bankruptcies 
• Increasing aggressiveness 
• Decreasing influence of government 
• Airfreight: from by-product to success factor 
• Increasing international capital flows 
4.1 A clear distinction between global network carriers and niche players 
In the most recent past, a clear distinction has come about between global network carriers on 
the one hand and niche players on the other. The global network carriers have consolidated 
through so-called strategic alliances into a limited number of fiercely competing networks, 
both in passenger and in freight transport.2  Niche players have been able to exploit market 
opportunities that presented themselves because of geographic characteristics, for instance by 
operating strongly from small regional airports, or through specific services, such as low-cost 
activities and express freight transport. 
After the disappearance of the Qualiflyer Group in 2001, three important strategic alliances 
remain.3 Table 4 provides an overview of their present composition. 
The purpose of alliances is clear to see: through technological cooperation and the tool-
sharing that it implies (code sharing, interlining,…), potential customers are offered a 
network that covers the greatest possible number of major destinations, and at the same time 
profitability is assured and even enhanced. The pressure of profitability shall continue to exist 
                                                 
2 Of course most global network carriers apply a mix of strategies and act simultaneously on markets of several 
types . Yield management has been a fundamental tool for this type of strategy. 
3 The question arises whether more concentration can result in market dominance by a limited number of 
carriers, with the risk of abuse of market power. 
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in the near future, so that one may assume that a further concentration movement will ensue.   
However, the question does arise whether this concentration will be achieved through the 
inclusion of new partners, or through a more profound integration of existing partners, or 
perhaps through both. There are, after all, still a number of European carriers, such as 
Olympic Airways and Brussels Airlines, that are not part of an alliance. However, 
incorporation into an alliance will only happen if there is no overlap with the existing 
network, i.e. with the present alliance members. Moreover, the positive effect on the 
profitability of the alliance must be clear to see. A far-reaching integration within an existing 
alliance, on the other hand, is likely to be complicated by intercontinental legal 
discrepancies.4
 
Table 4. Composition of strategic alliances (2007) 
Alliance Air companies 
Star Alliance 
Air Canada, Air New Zealand, ANA, Asiana Airlines, Austrian, bmi, Polish 
Airlines, Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, Singapore Airlines, South-
African Airways, Spanair, Swiss, TAP Portugal, Thai Airways International, 
United, US Airways 
Regional members: Adria, Blue1, Croatia Airlines 
SkyTeam 
Aeroflot, Aeromexico, Air France, KLM, Alitalia, China Southern, 
Continental Airlines, Czech Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Korean Air, 
Northwest Airlines 
Associates: Air Europa, Copa Airlines, Kenya Airways 
Oneworld American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, Japan Airlines, LAN, Malev, Quantas, Royal Jordanian 
 
Source: Star Alliance (2007), SkyTeam (2007) and Oneworld (2007) 
 
The niche market is in full movement. In 2005, a totally new product was launched that is 
known as ‘business-only transatlantic travel’. Aircraft are converted into a configuration to 
suit the business traveler, with personal space and a check-in procedure that is more speedy 
and less stressful than in services offered by traditional carriers. Promoted as a low-fare, all-
business-class service, the aim is to persuade economy-class customers to pay slightly more 
in return for a more personalised service. In the London to US market, three airlines were 
operating such a service in 2007: EOS Airlines, Maxjet Airways en Silverjet. All of them 
disappeared before June 20085. 
 
Table 5. New all-business carriers operating from the UK (2007) 
Airline  Fleet Aircraft planned Airports served London-NY rtn from 
Eos Airlines 4 x Boeing 757-200s 1 x 757-200 Stansted, JFK $ 2,678 
Maxjet 
 
5 x 767-200ERs  Stansted, JFK, Los 
Angeles, Washington, 
Las Vegas 
$ 1,548 
Silverjet 2 x 767-200ERs 3 x 767-200ERs Luton, Newark $ 1,798 
Source: Flight International, based on airlines 
                                                 
4 A typical example is the US prohibition on foreign companies acquiring a stake of over 25% in an American 
carrier. 
5 EOS launched its service between Stansted and New York JFK in October 2005, but ceased operations on 28 
April 2008. Maxxjet ceased operations on 26 December 2007, while Silverjet ceased operations on 30 May 
2008. 
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The success of such services has inspired Lufthansa, KLM and Swiss International Airlines to 
launch their own all-business transatlantic flights from continental Europe. To this end, they 
cooperate with the Swiss operator PrivatAir.6
An example of a regional niche strategy is that of Cathay Pacific, which in 2006 acquired an 
82.2% stake in Dragonair for the price of EUR 730 million.7 In this manner, the Hong Kong 
carrier was able to broaden its access to the lucrative and fast-growing Chinese air transport 
market, extending its operations there from 2 to 21 routes. 
4.2 More privatisation 
The former air transport market, dominated by flag carriers that were completely or largely 
controlled by national authorities, has disappeared. Former flag carriers have been or are in 
the process of being wholly or partially privatised. New entries are almost always financed 
with private capital. Table 6 demonstrates this evolution for selected European airlines. 
 
Table 6. Public ownership of airline companies (%) 
  2000 2006 
Air France 56.0 18.6 
British Airways - - 
Alitalia 53.0 49.0 
Austrian 39.7 - 
Bmi - - 
Iberia - - 
KLM - 18.6 
Olympic 100.0 100.0 
TAP 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Airline annual reports 
 
Table 6 shows very clearly how public stakes in carriers are becoming smaller or, in some 
cases, have disappeared altogether. Equally interesting is the fact that some airlines are now 
participating in the capital of other carriers; an illustration of how the process of integration 
can proceed. 
However, privatization does not necessarily mean that the prevailing competition rules are 
being respected. In February 2006, for example, the European Commission and the US 
Department of Justice announced an investigation into alleged collusion in the air cargo 
market. This was followed by an investigation in the long-haul passenger market, focusing on 
possible price collusion and, in particular, on fuel surcharges on top of normal fares, 
including in deals negotiated with large enterprises and holding companies. 
Privatisation movements also generate competitive strategies. In 2006, Ryanair acquired a 
blocking minority in Aer Lingus, facilitating its own bid for the former flag carrier and 
enabling it to prevent others from bidding. The Irish state retained a 25.4% stake. This battle 
                                                 
6 The system works as follows: PrivatAir leases the aircraft and draws up a wet-lease contract with the airline in 
question. PrivatAir provides the crew, catering and in-flight entertainment, it takes care of maintenance and 
bears all operational risks. The partner airline markets the service and sells the tickets. 
7 The deal revolved around a cash transaction and a complex share exchange agreement, which also involved 
Air China and the British parent company of Cathay Pacific, Swire Pacific. As a consequence, Air China 
acquired a 10% stake in Cathay, while Cathay was able to double its stake in Air China to 20%. 
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for control over Aer Lingus illustrates how the public authorities can become involved in a 
tug of war over a largely privatised carrier.  
The privatisation wave is also noticeable in the airport sector. Carriers will in the future be 
increasingly confronted with privatised airports. Unlike when those airports were publicly 
operated, the main goal is now profit maximisation. The result is bilateral negotiations 
between two profit maximisers that (must) take into account the portfolio of alternative 
solutions available to their adversary. 
4.3 Alliances influenced by cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
The purpose of alliances, mergers and takeovers are similar: to enhance operational and 
marketing efficiency; to achieve better financial results; to realise industrial-economic 
improvements through scale effects and by lowering barriers to entry.  
Mergers and takeovers also have a clear impact on the composition of alliances, and thus on 
their economic performances. Here, there is much to be learnt from past experiences in 
maritime transport. The example of P&O Nedlloyd is quite illustrative in this respect. In 
1998, this shipping company helped establish the Grand Alliance. However, after the 
takeover by Maersk in 2005, it pulled out. To compensate for this loss, the Grand Alliance 
concluded deals with the New World Alliance on a number of routes. Clearly, then, alliances 
as such are not stable, but subject to continuous movements and the associated entry and exit 
of partners. 
A similar situation is threatening to unfold in the air transport business. The  takeover of 
Alitalia by Air France/KLM will not result in a reshuffle of alliances, as both companies 
belong to the SkyTeam group, but matters would have been quite different had US Airways’ 
2006 bid for Delta Air Lines succeeded. The new merger would have created the world’s 
largest carrier. The effect on existing alliances would have been twofold. The alliance to 
which the merged company belonged would have become the dominant player, and within 
that alliance, the merged company would have become the dominant partner over the other 
participating carriers. The other alliance would have lost an important American partner and 
would thus have been weakened substantially. 
Since the increased bid from US Airways for Delta Air Lines in 2007, it has also become 
apparent that a consolidation wave is inevitable. In the United States, five of the six 
international carriers were involved in merger talks in 2007.8 Especially a merger/takeover 
involving both Continental and United Airlines would generate substantial benefits given the 
limited overlap between their respective networks. However, the two carriers belong to 
different alliances. Moreover, there are industrial-economic barriers to take into account in 
these kinds of mergers.9
In Europe, too, a consolidation movement is gaining momentum, with possible consequences 
for the existing alliances. The Spanish company Iberia has, since 1999, been operating under 
an alliance with British Airways, in which the latter carrier, for that matter, has a 10% stake 
in stock exchange quoted Iberia. At the beginning of 2007, the Iberia management was not 
excluding the possibility of an alliance with Air France/KLM or Lufthansa. A response was 
                                                 
8 Delta Air Lines is, for example, talking to Northwest Airlines, while United Airlines is engaged in separate 
negotiations with Continental and Northwest Airlines.  
9 In 2001, Northwest Airlines and Continental struck a deal whereby they could sell tickets on each other’s 
flights. Also, Northwest acquired the right, under certain conditions, to block any merger between Continental 
and another company. 
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not long in coming: on 30 March 2007, the Texan investment group TPG, with support from 
British Airways and three Spanish investment groups, put in a bid for Iberia. This movement 
illustrates what typically lies in store: a consolidation movement towards three large 
European groups, gravitating around the three largest carriers, namely Lufthansa, British 
Airways and Air France/KLM. 
4.4 Survival of the Southwest model 
The Southwest model has proven to be successful, and hence has been copied in the rest of 
the world. The model was based on strict adherence to a number of principles: short-haul, 
point-to-point, dense routes only, maximisation of flying hours, use of secondary airports, 
high frequency of service, no delays. It strove to combine low costs, low fares and high 
demand and capacity utilisation (see Macário et al., 2007). 
The European LCA market continues to grow strongly, cf. growth rates for 2006 for Ryanair 
(+23%) and easyJet (+16%). Low-cost companies are increasing their market share vis-à-vis 
the traditional carriers and charter companies. The important question arises whether this 
growth rate can be maintained in the future. 
In an analysis by Deutsche Bank from May 2007, it was calculated that the LCA market will 
continue to experience a volume growth of roughly 15%, as a consequence of a combination 
of shifts from other air transport segments, GDP growth, and a very modestly rising 
propensity to travel. All major low-cost companies are expected to achieve annual growth 
rates of less than 15%, while Ryanair is expected to grow by 20% annually (Deutsche Bank, 
2007, p. 5). This outlook is enhanced if one considers the investment strategy of carriers such 
as Air Berlin, Ryanair and easyJet. Table 7 provides an overview of aircraft orders and 
deliveries. 
 
Table 7. Estimated number of aircraft and passengers carried by European LCAs until 
2012 
Number of 
aircraft 
2005 2006 2007 F 2008 E 2009 E 2010 E 2011 E 2012 E 
Easyjet 108 120 143 160 177 194 211 228 
Ryanair 87 113 132 152 172 192 212 225 
Others 152 181 221 260 302 347 395 458 
Total 347 414 495 572 651 733 818 910 
Passengers        
Easyjet 28 34 38 42 46 51 55 60 
Ryanair 31 41 48 55 62 69 76 81 
Others 45 56 67 79 92 106 122 141 
Total 105 130 152 176 201 227 253 282 
 
Note: F – Forecast, E - Estimate 
Source: Lopes (2005), airlines websites, authors calculations 
 
It is clear that present economic activity is continuing to stimulate the growth of the LCAs. 
At the same time, it is becoming more likely that certain inputs will become more expensive, 
resulting in a slowdown in growth. Moreover, there are signs that the market is reaching a 
degree of maturity (MINTeL, 2006). This is undoubtedly why initiatives have been 
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announced or indeed are already being launched in relation to long-haul low-cost routes.10 
Here, the question arises of what the price difference with the traditional carriers will be. 
And, more importantly still perhaps, how customers will respond to this product. 
4.5 More bankruptcies 
Bankruptcies and takeovers used to be rare in the air transport sector during the era of the so-
called flag-carriers. More recently, however, such events have become more common and 
have had a significant impact on the market function and competition. By way of illustration, 
table 8 provides an overview of bankruptcies, mergers and takeovers in the European low-
cost airlines sector from 1999 to 2006. The figures provided suggest that, in the case of some 
carriers (e.g. Air Berlin), increasing market share is attributable to takeovers of other carriers. 
Also in Europe, we have witnessed the demise of some traditional flag carriers (e.g. Swissair 
and Sabena in 2001), while other airlines appear to be constantly struggling for survival (e.g. 
Alitalia and Olympic Airways). Strikingly, the companies in question are often medium-sized 
international airlines. Doganis (2001) asserts that these airlines are “too small to be global 
players, too big to be a niche player”. Their mission is unclear, they usually find it hard to 
take optimal strategic decisions and, in most cases, they are undercapitalised.11
In the United States, the situation is different. First and foremost, the recent past has seen 
many companies file for Chapter-11 protection against creditors. At the same time, 
reorganisation measures have been pushed through and new, cheaper deals have been 
negotiated with partners.12 The consequence is twofold: the majors generally get out of 
Chapter 11 with a lower cost structure (e.g. due to dramatic staff reductions) and hence 
greater competitive strength, but their regional partners come under greater pressure and must 
adapt their strategies. Mesa Air Group, for example, flies for as many majors as it can, while 
also flying independently on smaller niche routes. 
It would appear that the trend of recent years will persist in the future, resulting in 
consolidation into a limited number of large network carriers as well as a limited number of 
large low-cost carriers. This evolution will undoubtedly impact on the market structure and 
on market behaviour, and possibly holds the risk of abuse of market power. Carriers that do 
not belong to strategic alliances will then become likely victims of bankruptcy and prime 
targets for takeovers and mergers. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Examples include Oasis Hong Kong Airlines (flights between Hong Kong and London), Air Asia, Virgin 
Blue, Zoom... 
11 The air transport industry in its future configuration of interacting submarkets will remain a capital intensive 
industry. 
12 In this context, David Field writes: “Wielding the power of bankruptcy, US majors have forced their regional 
partners to fly for less, but given them more leeway to fly for other airlines”. And he adds: “Through their 
powers in bankruptcy, both Delta and Northwest put almost all regional flying out for competitive re-bidding, 
and the downward pressure on margins spread through the industry.” (Flight International, 22-28 May 2007, p. 
32).  
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Table 8. Bankruptcies, mergers and takeovers in the European low-cost airlines sector 
Year Airline Country Event 
1999 AB Airlines UK Bankruptcy 
 Color Air Norway Bankruptcy 
 Debonair UK Bankruptcy 
2002 GO UK Bankruptcy 
2003 Air Lib France Bankruptcy 
 Buzz UK Merger with Ryanair 
 Goodjet Sweden Bankruptcy 
2004 Air Polinia Poland Bankruptcy 
 Basiq Air Netherlands Merger with Transavia 
 Duo Airways UK Bankruptcy 
 Flying Finn Finland Bankruptcy 
 Germania Express Germany Merged with dba 
 GetJet Poland Bankruptcy 
 Jetgreen Ireland Bankruptcy 
 Skynet Airlines UK Bankruptcy 
 V-Bird Netherlands Bankruptcy 
 VolareWeb Italy Bankruptcy 
2005 Air Andalucia Spain Bankruptcy 
 Eujet Ireland Bankruptcy 
 Intersky Austria Bankruptcy 
 Maersk Air Denmark Merged with Sterling 
2006 Air Tourquoise France Bankruptcy 
 Air Wales UK Bankruptcy 
 Budget Air Ireland Bankruptcy 
 dba Germany Merged with Air Berlin 
 Flywest France Bankruptcy 
 HiFly / Air Luxor Portugal Bankruptcy 
 MyTravelite UK Reintegrated into MyTravel Airways 
 Snalskjunsten Sweden Bankruptcy 
2007 LTU Germany Merged with Air Berlin 
 
Source: Mintel, 2006 
 
It would appear that the trend of recent years will persist in the future, resulting in 
consolidation into a limited number of large network carriers as well as a limited number of 
large low-cost carriers. This evolution will undoubtedly impact on the market structure and 
on market behaviour, and possibly holds the risk of abuse of market power. Carriers that do 
not belong to strategic alliances will then become likely victims of bankruptcy and prime 
targets for takeovers and mergers. 
4.6 Increasing aggressiveness 
The air transport sector provides a good example of the potential response to new market 
entries in an industrial economy. Consider the hypothetical example of a new entrant in the 
marketplace launching a service on a particular route. The carriers already operating on that 
route will almost always respond with sharp price cuts, combined with increased capacity. As 
soon as the new carrier retreats, capacity is decreased again and prices are increased. 
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Alternatively in such a situation, flag carriers might purchase or launch an in-house low-cost 
carrier. 
While initially the low-cost airlines tended to exhibit aggressive behaviour vis-à-vis the flag 
carriers, we now see the opposite happening. The large flag carriers are challenging the low-
cost carriers on their short-haul destinations, and feeding these passengers to their more 
profitable full-service long-haul routes.13 Flag carriers such as British Airlines, Lufthansa and 
Air France/KLM have all changed the product of ‘short-distance flights’ quite drastically: 
more straightforward economy classes, the introduction of on-line reservation, the 
elimination of travel agents’ commissions, no or exclusively paid-for catering.  
This increasingly aggressive behaviour will persist in the future, as one can already infer 
from the sometimes strange developments at the takeover front. An example that comes to 
mind is Air Berlin, a low-cost carrier operating in the European market which in 2007 
acquired LTU, an airline focusing on the long-haul holiday market. Also in 2007, there was 
the hostile bid from Ryanair, Europe’s largest budget carrier, for that other Irish airline, Aer 
Lingus. It is a bid, for that matter, which stands very little chance of succeeding, if only 
because of the fact that the European Commission will not accept the dominant position that 
Ryanair would thus acquire at Dublin airport. 
4.7 Decreasing influence of government 
While for decades the air transport business was directed and controlled by the public 
authorities, this government influence is now far less apparent. The traditional flag carriers 
are disappearing, not in the least because the public authorities are partially or wholly selling 
their share in the capital of these companies. Deregulation is gaining momentum, and the 
influence of the national authorities is now restricted mainly to two areas.14 First and 
foremost, the public sector will most likely continue to provide the basic airport 
infrastructure. Second, they are still generally expected to act against any abuse of monopoly 
status in relation to pricing, landing slot allocation or access to terminals. 
The (supra)national authorities for their part may be expected to assume a more prominent 
role in the environmental field. The European Commission, for example, is committed to a 
reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2020 to 30% of levels in the reference year 1990. The 
airline industry shall be included in an EU emissions trading scheme. In an initial phase, to be 
implemented from 2011, only European carriers will be part of the mandatory scheme.15 
Entitlements would be distributed among the carriers for free by the European Commission 
itself, on the basis of airlines’ average emissions in 2004-06 period. Just 10% of the emission 
rights shall be auctioned. 
The airline industry is already responding to this trend. In 2007, easyJet introduced its own 
so-called ‘eco-friendly aircraft design’, which uses existing technologies that could halve 
carbon dioxide emissions and produce 75% less NOx by 2015.16 IATA, meanwhile, has 
                                                 
13 Flag carriers such as British Airlines, Lufthansa and Air France/KLM generate around two-thirds of their 
revenues through long-distance flights, where they face no competition from low-cost/low-fare airlines. A 
carrier such as Alitalia achieves just a third of its revenues from long-distance flights, and is therefore much 
more sensitive to aggressive behaviour on the part of low-cost carriers. 
14 In addition, the public authorities will continue to be involved in the funding of aircraft construction, 
especially in the fields of research, design and the launch of new aircraft types. 
15 At present, only heavy industry and power companies have access to the emissions market. Under American 
pressure, the EU has decided that the scheme will be opened up to foreign airlines only gradually. 
16 Flight International, 19-25 June 2007, p. 14. 
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launched a zero emission goal for the airline industry. The environmental issue, then, is likely 
to become one of the most significant points of debate within the airline sector. Here, 
government clearly has an important regulatory and supervisory role to play. 
4.8 Airfreight: from by-product to success factor 
Airfreight is a growth market. In terms of value, the sector accounted for approximately 40%  
of international freight transport in 2005. As figure 4 shows, airfreight is a rather 
heterogeneous product. 
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Figure 4. Airfreight, a heterogeneous product 
While airfreight was traditionally regarded as a by-product of passenger transport, there are 
now a number of companies focusing exclusively on this segment (Herman and Van de 
Voorde, 2006).17  
The relatively growing importance of full-freighter transport is occasioned by a combination 
of factors. For one thing, the available freight capacity in passenger aircraft is insufficient to 
satisfy growing demand. Second, on certain airfreight routes, there is a strong imbalance 
between incoming and outgoing freight, so that a different network structure imposes itself. 
In addition, there is an ongoing consolidation trend whereby freight is combined at hubs, and 
these larger volumes are resulting in more competitive full-freighter operations.  
Airfreight will continue to expand more rapidly than passenger transport in the coming years. 
As long as airfreight can contribute to profit maximisation and growing market share, carriers 
will want to operate in this growth market, be it as a by-product of air passenger flows or in a 
full-freighter configuration. 
4.9 Increased foreign capital 
The dilution of the flag carrier concept, which is characterised by a declining involvement of 
public funds and the entry of more private capital, has resulted in an important evolution in 
terms of industrial and capital structure. In the case of some airlines, and indeed airports, we 
have witnessed a three-step movement. First, there was the disintegration phase, with 
companies refocusing on the core business. In the second step, such non-core activities as 
                                                 
17 The genuine full-freighter companies often operate in the ‘ad hoc’, irregular airfreight market. Moreover, it 
often concerns small, unquoted companies so that there are virtually no official data on their operational and 
financial performance (Herman and Van de Voorde, 2006). 
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catering, handling and maintenance were sold off. Finally, in the third phase, this evolution is 
commonly combined with the entry of external capital.18
Increasingly, it appears to be private equity that enters the sector. Table 9 provides an 
overview of a number of significant capital movements involving private equity in the 
Belgian airline market. 
 
Table 9. Private equity in the Belgian airline industry 
Date Target Purchaser Million € 
November 2004 BIAC (70%) Macquarie Bank 735 
July 2005 Aviapartner 3i 165 
 
Similar movements are now occurring elsewhere. One recent example is the bid and takeover 
from Macquarie Bank and Texas Pacific Group (TPG) for the Australian carrier Qantas. 
The question that arises is whether the entry of private equity capital in the airline industry is 
not at odds with companies’ long term interests. Private equity groups tend to sell relatively 
quickly, i.e. within a period of three to five years. It remains to be seen, though, to what 
extent the strong cyclical movements in the airline industry may pose a problem in this 
respect. And to what extent may possible ‘exits’ from the capital of airlines and airports by 
private equity groups result in new consolidation movements?19
5. Conclusion 
Being a capital-intensive business that is undergoing very rapid technological and 
organisational change, the air transport industry is in constant need of insight into future 
market evolutions. Hence, the purpose of this contribution was to provide an understanding 
of likely developments in the sector after 2010. 
There is no such thing as a single homogenous air transport market. It is rather a 
configuration of various submarkets that are interconnected and therefore interact. The 
general feeling is that growth will persist beyond 2010. And, if one looks at the market from 
an international and aggregated perspective, this will indeed most likely be the case, if only 
because of the expected further expansion of the Asian growth market. However, aggregated 
data often mask underlying, sometimes opposite evolutions. For this reason, we have chosen 
to base our approach on a number of hypotheses. 
Each of the hypotheses studied implies a movement over a period of time, often with 
structural consequences. In summary, we predict that the air transport market after 2010 will 
be characterised by: further specialisation, from global network carriers over full air freight 
                                                 
18 There is much to be learnt from individual cases. An interesting example is the battle for the acquisition of the 
American company Midwest Airlines. In 2005, AirTran Airways, a low-cost carrier based in Florida, 
approached the management of Midwest Airlines, with headquarters at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The purpose was 
to merge the two regional networks into a national network. In 2007, the bid was eventually rejected. The 
management of Midwest Airlines was however prepared to accept another bid, led by TPG Capital, a private-
equity firm, in partnership with Northwest. It was Northwest’s purpose to prevent AirTran from establishing a 
low-cost hub in Milwaukee, in the proximity of its own hubs at Minneapolis and Detroit. 
19 In the airport sector, we are already seeing a strong concentration into a number of large groups: BAA (United 
Kingdom), Aena (Spain), Fraport (Germany), Aéroport de Paris (France), Macquarie Airports (Australia), 
Schiphol (Netherlands), Ferrovial (Spain). 
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carriers to niche players, including in the low-cost or low-fare market; the establishment of 
new alliances, and the international transfer of capital that this entails; relatively easy market 
access, resulting in frequent entries and exits, which in itself will lead to more aggressive 
behaviour in the market; less public intervention and more private investment, with the role 
of the public authorities restricted to core tasks, such as basic infrastructure provision and 
safety & security. 
It is within this broad future framework, marked by a considerable degree of uncertainty, that 
the market players will position themselves. In the air transport business, too, growing and/or 
surviving is a matter of recognition, measurement and knowledge. 
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